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, INTRODUCTION 
The 216-29 Recuplex CAW (CA column waste) 
Wastc Disposal Cavern, also known as the Z 9  Trench or 
the 2 9  Crib, is locatcd ncar the Plutonium Finishing 
Plant (PFP) facilityat the Ilanford Site in Eastern 
Washington State. The 216-29 Crib was used as a 
disposal site for efllucnt chemical and radiological wastes 
from the recovery of uranium and plutonium through 
extraction or ECUPLEX process, a method that 
recovered uranium and plutonium from liquid and solid 
wastes and scraps from other PFP process. 
The 5 9  Crib was constructed as an engineered 
trench with an open a m  resembling a cavern or cave 
beneath a concrete slab. It is 6.4m (2 I-n) deep with a 
23cm (9-in) thick concrete slab measuring 27Am by 
36.6m (90-R x 120 R). Figure 1. The 2-9 Crib received 
liquid wastes from 1955 through 1962. which amountcd 
to approximately one million gallons (4 x IO6 L) of liquid 
wastes during its operating life. Analyses of the crib soil 
in seven locations to a depth ofup to six feet (two meters) 
beneath the crib floor indicated that the plutonium content 
of the crib soil ranged from 50 to IS0 kg ( h e  highest 
concentration rncasured was 34.5 g/L ofsoil). The 
historyofthe216-2-9 CribasofNovember 1971 has 
been documented by Crawley, including information 
and hazards evaluations of the crib soil. [I] 
In 1973, a decision was made to remove the top 
30 cm of contaminated soil as a means of reducing the 
risk of a criticality incident. Thc soil at the bottom of the 
crib was rcmoved using a clamshell digger and conveyer 
bucket system. A hydnulically-operated clamshell was 
suspended from a trolley assembly that traveled along a ' 







regarding deposition of plutonium, sampling and analysis, 
I 
I 
trench floor and deposited the soil into the soil bucket that 
resided on an inclined elcvator carriage. The conveyer 
extended from the trench floor through the trench roof 
into the glovcbox locatcd in the packaging building.[2] 
Prior to the initiation ofexcavation or mining 
activities. the 2 16-Z9A, the Contamhated Soil Removal 
Building, the 216- Z9B, Operator's Cubicle, and the 216- 
Z9C. Mining Apparatus Enclosure wcrc constructed next 
to and on top of the crib cover. Mining equipment was 
installed beneath the crib cover and suspended on 
structural supports in ordcr to remove soil and package it 
in cans for plutonium recovery or disposal, depending on 
the concentration ofplutonium in the retrieved soil. 
Mining ofthe enclosed Z 9  Crib trench was completed in 
1978 with the removal of approximately 58 kg of 
plutonium. The 216-2-9 Facilities were placed in l ayq  
status at the completion of the mining activities. 
WORK DESCRIPTION: 
Deactivation and Decommissioning (D&D) 
planning and characterization work has begun on (he crib 
buildings and mining structures. In order to accomplish 
the D&D however, analyses of the structural integrity of 
the crib cover, the shut-down ventilation system, 
combustible gases and other chemical and radiological 
constitucnts of the crib atmosphere and potential air 
emissions are required. 
Technical issues identificd prior to conducting 
building removal include structural stability of the crib 
cover and mining apparatus and combustible/toxic gases 
within the crib area. Based on existing knowledge of the 
facility and site, concerns over the structural integrity of 
the crib slab, which provides support for the mining 
structures and equipment and also containment for 
preventing airborne release of contamination, are 
significant. For example, recent video taping and high 
1 
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resolution photography of the underside of the concrete 
crib cover has shown that many protective tiles have 
fallen from the cover indicating areas of the undersurface 
are unprotected from the acidic environment of the crib 
atmosphere. Photographic characterization of the 
underside of the crib cover is on-going. 
with preventing radiological contamination and personnel 
exposure of site workers during the D&D. These concerns 
are related to the safety of personnel working on the cover 
slab or making entry into the trench, as well as the long- 
term integrity of the concrete cover for 20 years following 
building removal. A major source of concern is that 
hydrochloric acid (HCl) generated from the degradation 
of carbon tetrachloride has and could continue to degrade 
the integrity of the undersurface of the concrete cover and 
/or support columns. Structural issues also include the 
Additional issues to be resolved are associated 
Vent -, r vent 
Column Grade 
Figure 1. As-built section views of the 216- Z-9 Crib 
integrity of the buildings relative to safe demolition 
practices, continued integrity of the hanger rods to 
maintain building support loads, and continued integrity 
of the tile placement that provides protection to the 
concrete slab and columns. 
Wendel, in the layaway plan for the mining facilities, 
listed criteria for layaway of the facilities that discusses 
prevention of overloading the crib slab, prevention of the 
accumulation of flammable gases and decontamination of 
all equipment.[3] 
This paper provides the approach proposed in 
gathering the required data to safely perform the D&D 
activities for the Z-9 Crib buildings and mining structures, 
and preliminary photographic data. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTUAL WORK 
In order to decommission the crib mining 
structure and the equipment attached to the Z-9 Crib, an 
analysis of four issues must be accomplished. These 
issues are: 
1. Determine the structural integrity of the crib trench slab 
for bearing live loads during D&D and also for serving as 
a containment barrier to control potential alpha airborne 
emissions for 20 years, 
2. Determine the nature of the gases generated &om 
radiolytic hydrolysis of water and organics accumulating 
in the kencb area under the cover slab for potential 
flammable concentrations of gases, 
3. Determine the use and condition of the electrical 
equipment and the ventilation system during the D&D 
effort, and 
4. Collect the radiological data for additional nuclear 
safety analyses needed for the D&D work in the glovebox 
to proceed. 
To define the data needs associated with 
determining the structural integrity of the crib cover, a 
data quality objectives process was performed. The 
resulting data needs that were identified included 
comprehensive, high resolution photography of the cn% 
cover underside and visual structural inspection of the 
buildings and crib cover surface. These data will provide 
information for complete structural analysis by an expert 
engineering team. 
A structural inspection and cleanup of the 216-Z- 
9B, Operator Cubicle which provides a view into the crib 
area, was completed. Routine access by engineers is now 
allowed. 
A manned entry into the crib area was 
considered by the project management team as a way to 
obtain the required data. Due to ALARA concerns as 
well as concerns regarding chemical vapors and structural 
obstructions, manned entry at this time will be avoided. 
Instead, the team acquired a robotic crawler fitted with 
high intensity lighting, and a high resolution camera was 
constructed to provide the photographic data for the 
inspection. 
The robotic crawler was deployed and 
preliminary photographs were taken as shown in Figures 
2 and 3. 
2 
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Important lessons learned in the project involved 
the use of a mockup and a dry run. A mockup of the crib 
riser was developed and a dry run of the equipment 
deployment was performed at a Hanford facility. As a 
result of this exercise, several important changes were 
made to the work evolution instructions. As a result, the 
deployment of the robot crawler and cameras went 
exactly as planned. Additionally, the preparation of a 
work plan including a quality assurance project plan was 
important in ensuring that the data gathering is 
comprehensive and meets the needs of the engineering 
team. [4] 
Firmre 2. A view of the underside of the 21 6-29  Crib REFERENCES - 
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Figure 3. Bottom and side view of Operators Cubicle 
showing viewing window. 
RESULTSLESSONS LEARNED 
Initial high resolution photography has shown 
that the condition of the crib cover is compromised by the 
absence of protective tiles in large areas of the concrete. 
The supporting columns appear to be in good condition. 
The surface of the soil is littered with broken tiles and 
concrete material. 
of the crib c o n f m  that hazards exist for manned entry. 
Initial air sampling and analysis results show very low 
levels of flammable and toxic gases. 
accomplished efficiently and without incident. No 
radiological contamination was detected around the riser 
extension or the glove bag structure. 
The compromised roof and condition of the floor 
Deployment of robot crawler and cameras was 
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